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When firm 1 enjoys a first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly, it will produce: A)more output and charge a lower price than firm 2. B)more output and charge the same price as firm 2. C)less output and charge the same price as firm 2. D)less output and charge a higher price than firm 2. The inverse ournot, Stackelberg, or Bertrand duopoly: put decision. ts own output decision. verse demand function is P = m price and corresponding pete in a local market to sell gasoline to bserve the prices posted on each other’s in gasoline from their supplier at $3.90 ved changing the price of gasoline ightly undercut Inverted V’s price ... Model IV: Stackelberg Duopoly with Homogeneous Goods. In this model we return to a case of duopoly with homogeneous goods, but allow one firm a first-mover advantage. Model V: Stackelberg with More Firms.

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Stackelberg duopoly

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In the Stackelberg duopoly case (sd) we let firm 1 be the Stackelberg leader and firm 2 be the Stackelberg follower. The Stackelberg follower assumes that the Stackelberg leader can precommit to an output q∗ 1 that is best for it, i.e. the value of q1 that maximizes firm 1’s profits. The Stackelberg leader, unli ke in 1.In a Cournot duopoly the reaction function of Firm A identi es its optimal response to any quantity produced by Firm B. In the presence of private rms, the optimal quantity is the one that maximizes A, Firm A’s pro t, where A = P(Q)q A cq A = (140 q A q B)q A 20q A The rst order condition for pro t maximization is: @ A @q A = 140 2 q A B 20 ...

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An example is duopoly quantity competition by producersof complements. Here initial choice of the standard Stackelberg leader’samount constitutesa credible commitment to maintaining that output because it exceeds the Cournot–Nash quantity (and this initial choice is an equilibrium strategy).

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Stackelberg-Duopol. Das Stackelbergmodell ist ein strategisches Spiel in den Für die Existenz eines Gleichgewichts im Stackelberg-Duopol gibt es einige weitere...We analyze a Stackelberg multi-product duopoly game in which –rms incur a higher –xed cost when o⁄ering di⁄erent product lines in di⁄erent quality tiers (mixed mode) than when o⁄ering all product lines in the same quality tier (high or low). To the best of our knowledge, this type of inter-